The atomic bombs not only saved many thousands and possibly millions of Japanese lives, they saved the lives of even more Asians Beyond japan. under the unforgiving rule of the Imperial Japanese army, chinese, Southeast asians, and Indonesians were dying at a rate of perhaps 250,000 a month. had the war dragged on, it is horrific to imagine the dystopia that would have involved vast areas from Manchuria to borneo. at admittedly terrible cost, the atomic bombs averted the far greater catastrophe. it is also likely that it took both atomic bombs – as well as a Soviet invasion of Manchuria – to shake the Japanese military’s fanatical resolve and finally convert the emperor to the cause of peace, as well as his own self-preservation. 227
Thomas outlines the road to the use of the atomic bombs in Japan. The story is told primarily though the vantage points of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General Carl Spaatz, and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. The Americans made decisions about when and where to use the bombs, while Togo made an effort to get his country to surrender and prevent further casualties from a land invasion and by keeping suicidal military leaders from taking power in Japan and preventing surrender.
I don’t have enough background knowledge to really evaluate the case Thomas makes. The style of the book is to place you “in the room” and watch as the events leading to the bombing take place in real time, sort of the style of a popcorn movie. There’s not a lot of commentary that’s direct and breaks the fourth wall.
This style is very readable, and you have a sense of momentum as a reader. Of course, this is aided by the fact that you know the climax: they drop the bomb twice.
The largest question of the book is whether the use of the bombs was morally justified. The clearest, and best argued response is quoted above. The argument goes that only a brutal, overwhelming show of force would be enough to frighten Japan enough into surrender without a ground invasion of Japan. The number of deaths from the bombs would be way less than from continued war.
Invasion would kill huge numbers of US soldiers, Japanese soldiers, and Japanese civilians. Civilian populations under the control of the Japanese empire were being killed, and they longer Japan persisted, the more would die. So much economic activity in the Japanese empire was directed at the war effort that people were deprived and starving, and that would worsen if the conflict continued, so famine would kill hard to estimate numbers of people throughout Asia.
The basic structure of that argument makes sense to me: the bombs were the lesser of evils. But there’s not a ton of detailed evidence of how the numbers of death were modeled, or how good the methods were, etc. But the description of the Japanese Hardliner’s plan for fighting till the bitter end do make it seem plausible that the invasion would have been much bloodier.
There’s weaker evidence that the major decision makers were really struggling with the decision to use the bomb. The passages discussing internal conflict or guilt about the use of the bombs or hesitance don’t seem convincing. Could you even hold a wartime position, making those decisions if you were really conflicted? I guess the accounts of them hemming and hawing don’t sound to convincing. They’re like “Should we warn them? Should we drop a proof-of-concept bomb in the ocean to show them what we have? Should we hit a purely military base? What if the weather’s bad? What if we warn them and the bomb’s a dud? Fuck it, who are we kidding, drop it in the middle of the city.” In the context of invasion vs. bomb described above, it kind of makes sense. But taking steps to limit the bomb’s damage or civilian toll doesn’t seem to be a priority.
The book was an engaging read, but I got the sense that this was a bit of a popcorn, we’re the good guys, simplistic portrayal. But that’s just my feeling. I don’t have enough knowledge to really judge the book. The author does a nice job of bringing you into the room, and sharing a bit of what some of the people were like.
It was interesting to hear, especially about Stimpson, how old-fashioned aristocracy the vibe was. He was a really wealthy lawyer (or businessman?) who lived like a royal. Like had huge estates, chilled with all these other rich and powerful people, decided the fates of cities, decided not to bomb Kyoto cause he visited and like it. It seems like ancient Rome or something in that respect. Like out riding his horses for health at his estate, then jumping on the phone to tell his buddies who to kill next.
Idea Density: lower
Related Books: Command and Control
Recommend to others: maybe, if interested in topic
Reread personally: no
Quotes
These “ tender Souls” were pushing for a “ demonstration”– setting off a bomb in a desert or an island somewhere in the pacific, and inviting the enemy to watch. such a demonstration would be a “ fizzle”, Parsons wrote Groves. “ even the crater would be disappointing.” it would make a big flash but would not leave a huge hole in the ground. 32
It concludes that “ any small or strictly military objective should be located in a much larger area subject to blast damage in order to avoid undue risks of the weapon being lost due to bad placing of the bomb.” in other words, the bomb should be aimed at the center of the city. 33
Immediately, stimpson says, “I don’t want Kyoto bombed.” Kyoto was the ancient capital of japan. the Secretary of War went to Kyoto with Mabel in the late 1920s, during his tour as governor of the philippines. he knows it to be a beautiful city, full of sacred temples and shrines, still the cultural center of the nation. 41
After much discussion concerning various types of targets and the effects to be produced, the secretary expressed the conclusion, on which there was General agreement, that we could not give the Japanese any warning, that we should seek to make a profound impression on as many inhabitants as possible. at the suggestion of dr conant, the secretary agreed that the most desirable Target would be a vital War plan and pulling a large number of workers and closely surrounded by worker’s houses.
historians will later pick apart the double talk, the muddled product of men straining for consensus when faced with the impossible moral dilemma of total war: how to save lives by killing people. 47
The Japanese have guessed exactly where the American Landing Force plans to land, on the beaches of Kyushu, the southern island of the homeland. the armed forces are ready to greet the Invaders with some 7,000 Kamikaze planes, aimed to fly into the landing ships, and waves of three or 400. there are Patchwork planes, Man by pilots who know only how to take off, but the plan, by no means unrealistic, is to sync up to half the American Invasion Fleet before the boats can reach the beaches. the kamikazes in the air will be supported by a thousand suicide bombers and small speed boats, midget submarines, and swimmers sticking 10 kilo TNT charges to the bottoms of Landing crafts. 84
The atomic bombs not only saved many thousands and possibly millions of Japanese lives, they saved the lives of even more Asians Beyond japan. under the unforgiving rule of the Imperial Japanese army, chinese, Southeast asians, and Indonesians were dying at a rate of perhaps 250,000 a month. had the war dragged on, it is horrific to imagine the dystopia that would have involved vast areas from Manchuria to borneo. at admittedly terrible cost, the atomic bombs averted the far greater catastrophe. it is also likely that it took both atomic bombs – as well as a Soviet invasion of Manchuria – to shake the Japanese military’s fanatical resolve and finally convert the emperor to the cause of peace, as well as his own self-preservation. 227
The Digital Sauna 